Hannibal

Compiled from various sources.  See citations.

 

Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar Barca, (247 BC – c. 183 BC) was a Punic (See Carthage on the coast of North Africa on the map below) military commander and politician, later also working in other professions, who is popularly credited as one of the finest commanders in history. He lived during a period of tension in the Mediterranean, when Rome (then the Roman Republic) established its supremacy over other great powers such as Carthage, Macedon, Syracuse and the Seleucid empire. He is one of the best-known Carthaginian commanders. His most famous achievement was at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, when he marched an army, which included war elephants, from Iberia over the Pyrenees and the Alps into northern Italy.

During his invasion of Italy he defeated the Romans in a series of battles, including those at Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae. After the Battle of Cannae, Capua, the second largest city of the Roman Republic, defected from the Republic and joined Hannibal. Hannibal lacked the siege equipment necessary to attack the heavily defended city of Rome. He maintained an army in Italy for more than a decade afterward, never losing a major engagement, but never able to push the war through to a conclusion. During that period, the Roman armies regrouped. A Roman counter-invasion of North Africa forced him to return to Carthage, where he was defeated in the Battle of Zama. The defeat forced the Carthaginian Senate to send him into exile. During this exile, he lived at the Seleucid court, where he acted as military advisor to Antiochus III in his war against Rome. Defeated in a naval battle, Hannibal fled again, this time to the Bithynian court. When the Romans demanded his surrender, he preferred to commit suicide rather than submit.

Hannibal is universally ranked as one of the greatest military commanders and tacticians in history. Military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge once famously called Hannibal the "father of strategy", because his greatest enemy, Rome, came to adopt elements of his military tactics in their own strategic canon. This praise has earned him a strong reputation in the modern world and he was regarded as a "gifted strategist" by men like Napoleon Bonaparte and the Duke of Wellington. His life has also been the basis for a number of films and documentaries.


Hannibal began the most significant part of his military career in Spain (Hispania) when he inherited the command of the Carthaginian armies (221 BC) that his father and brother-in-law had commanded.  He set off to conquer Rome in 218 BC. He fought his way through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees (Northern Spain) and, by conciliating the Gaulish chiefs along his passage, reached the Rh™ne River (See map below) before the Romans could take any measures to bar his advance. Arriving at the Rh™ne in September, Hannibal's army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 37 war elephants (He was from Africa and thus elephants seemed like a good idea). This Hannibalic invasion of Italy is called the Second Punic War. [See the map below.]

 

Hannibal«s route of invasion

Given by the Department of History, United States Military Academy

 

He engaged the Romans in numerous battles É.

thenÉ.


The Battle of Cannae

 

In the spring of 216 B.C., Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. By seizing Cannae, Hannibal had placed himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their Consular elections in 216, they appointed Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus as Consuls. In the meantime, the Romans, hoping to gain success through sheer strength in numbers, raised a new army of unprecedented size, estimated by some to be as large as 100,000 men.

 

The Roman and Allied legions of the Consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward to Apulia. They eventually found him on the left bank of the Audifus River, and encamped six miles away. On this occasion, the two armies were combined into one, the Consuls having to alternate their command on a daily basis. The Consul Varro, who was in command on the first day, was a man of reckless and hubristic nature, and was determined to defeat Hannibal. Hannibal capitalized on the eagerness of Varro and drew him into a trap by using an envelopment tactic which eliminated the Roman numerical advantage by shrinking the surface area where combat could occur. Hannibal drew up his least reliable infantry in the center with the wings composed of his elite troops, the Gallic [Spanish and Gaulish] and Numidian cavalry. [Livy called the Numidians the hands-down best horsemen of Africa.  They rode small, fast Arabian horses without saddles or armor and only wielded a small shield, a short sword and a spear or javelin.  They were fast, agile, and incredibly damaging to enemy order.  They sowed chaos.]

 

Initial deployment and Roman attack.  Romans in red and HannibalŐs forces in blue. 

Hannibal intentionally put his weakest forces in the center.  When they pulled back [see arrows on the diagram above], the Roman forces followed. 

The Romans advanced into Hannibal's lines, which swung around them.


The Roman legions forced their way through Hannibal's weak center, but the Libyan Mercenaries (labeled "African Infantry" on the diagram above and below) in the wings swung around and menaced the Roman flanks. The onslaught of Hannibal's mounted forces was devastating, and Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian who commanded the left (labeled "Spanish and Gaulish Cavalry" in the blue-lined boxes), pushed in the Roman right and then swept across the rear and attacked Varro's cavalry on the Roman left. Then he attacked the legions from behind. As a result, the Roman army was hemmed in with no means of escape.  [See the other set of diagrams at the end of this page for a few more details on the battle tactics and the various commanders.]


Destruction of the Roman Army

The central blue (HannibalŐs) forces pulled back and sucked the central Roman forces to the right. 

The result was that the Roman forces were surrounded by HannibalŐs forces.

Both diagrams courtesy of The Department of History, United States Military Academy.


 

Due to these brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers [about 55k vs 75k Roman troops (all numbers associated with this battle are vague at best)], managed to surround and destroy all but a small remainder of this force. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that 50,000-70,000 Romans were killed or captured at Cannae (in one day!). [The Roman historians Livy and Polybius variously claim that 50,000-70,000 Romans died with about 3,000–4,500 taken prisoner. The fatalities for the Carthaginians amounted to about 6,000 men it has been estimated.] Among the dead were the Roman consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, as well two consuls for the preceding year, two quaestors, twenty-nine out of the forty-eight military tribunes and an additional eighty senators (at a time when the Roman Senate was comprised of no more than 300 men, this constituted 25%–30% of the governing body). This makes the Battle of Cannae one of the most catastrophic defeats in the history of Ancient Rome, and one of the bloodiest battles in all of human history (in terms of the number of lives lost within a single day). After Cannae, the Romans were not as enthusiastic in challenging Hannibal in pitched battles, instead preferring to defeat him by attrition, relying on their advantages of supply and manpower. As a result, Hannibal and Rome fought no more major battles in Italy for the rest of the war.

 

The effect on morale of this victory meant that many parts of Italy joined Hannibal's cause. As Polybius notes, "How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae, than those which preceded it can be seen by the behavior of RomeŐs allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman Power.". During that same year, the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, while the Macedonian king, Philip V pledged his support to Hannibal – thus initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed King Hieronymous of Syracuse. It is often argued that if Hannibal would have received proper material reinforcements from Carthage he might have succeeded with a direct attack upon Rome. For the present he had to content himself with subduing the fortresses which still held out against him, and the only other notable event of 216 BC was the defection of Capua, the second largest city of Italy, which Hannibal made his new base. However, only a few of the Italian city-states which he had expected to gain as allies consented to join him.


Hannibal and his army wandered around Italy for about 15 years (218-203 BC) and wreaked havoc. Meanwhile Carthage had been steadily declining in wealth and stature while Hannibal was off warring in Italy. Rome had even conquered much of the Iberian penninsula [led by Scipio Africanus] where Carthage had traditionally been very strong and they conquered the extremely important city of Syracuse on the island of Sicily. Finally Rome sent forces led by Scipio Africanus to attack Carthage directly. This action forced Hannibal to leave Italy in order to defend his African homeland.  This time around his famous tactics didn't work.  The Roman forces were much better seasoned and knew that Hannibal was a tricky tactician. In the resulting major engagement (at Zamia in 202 BC – Zamia or Zama is a bit inland from the city of Carthage.) Carthage lost approximately 31,000 troops with an additional 15,000 wounded. In contrast, the Romans suffered only 1500 casualties. The battle resulted in a loss of respect for Hannibal by his fellow Carthaginians. It marked the last major battle of the Second Punic War, with Rome the victor. Hannibal lost.  In 201 he signed a peace treaty with Rome and was dishonored and retired.  The conditions of defeat were staggering.  Carthage gave its huge fleet of warships to Rome.  They had to formally recognize the Roman conquests of Iberian lands and they had to pay a huge sum of money in 50 annual installments to Rome. 

 

Hannibal rebuilt his credibility and rose in the political hierarchy.  Rumors claimed that he started thinking about another run at Rome and that he started to negotiate with the Seleucid Empire (i.e., the post-Hellenistic empire that controlled modern day Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Iran) for support.  When the Romans got wind of his supposed plans, they sent an investigative team and Hannibal fled to the East, to Ephasus on the Ionian coast of Turkey and then to Antioch (in modern day Syria).  He hung out with the Seleucid Emperor and advised him on military matters.  He eventually was given command of a Seleucid fleet, but was defeated in 190 BC and ended up in league with a rebel Seleucid governor who set up in Arminia.  He fled again and ended up in the court of the king of Bythnia (a province which contained the famous city of Nicaea... sort of close to modern day Istambul).  In 184 Hannibal, commanding his fleet, had one last victory.  In 183 BC (or 182 or 181 ... the sources are not clear) Hannibal saw no escape from capture by the Romans and poisoned himself. 

 



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© Jona Lendering for Livius.Org, 1995.  Revision: 15 March 2008


Livy, The War with Hannibal

 

Lendering, Jona, "Hannibal," Livius: Articles on Ancient History, http://www.livius.org/ha-hd/hannibal/hannibal.html

 

Wikipedia contributors, "Hannibal," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hannibal&oldid=317494691 (accessed October 4, 2006).